Différence, Deference, and the Notion of Proper Reading by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Yarbrough, Stephen R.
DIFFÉRANCE, DEFERENCE, AND THE QUESTION OF PROPER READING 
 
By: Stephen R. Yarbrough 
 
Yarbrough, Stephen R (1987) "Différence, Deference, and the Notion of Proper Reading."  Man and World 20 
(Spring):  257-82. 
 
Made available courtesy of Springer Netherlands: http://www.springer.com/ 
 
***Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is authorized without written permission from 
Springer Netherlands. This version of the document is not the version of record. Figures and/or 
pictures may be missing from this format of the document.*** 
 
Article: 
The early Greeks were aware that situation, propriety, and originality comprised a unity, and they believed that 
this unity marked the difference between grammar and the full speech of discourse. Isocrates, for example, said 
in "Against the Sophists" that 
 
. . . the greatest proof of the difference between these two arts is that oratory is good only if it has the 
qualities of fitness for the occasion [      ], propriety of style [π       ], and originality of 
treatment [     ], while in the case of letters there is no such need whatsoever.1 
 
Of these the central term is prepon [      ]. As Max Pohlenz has brilliantly demonstrated, the history of 
classical art theory is in fact the history of the concept of the proper.
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In the last decade the notion of propriety has again become problematic for literary theory. The problem is not 
merely that twentieth-century developments in phenomenology undermined projects that describe truth in terms 
of representation, or that extensions from structural linguistics to semiotics have forced philosophers of 
language to contest the idea of the text upon which these projects depend. The problem is more far-reaching 
because modern thought has simply forgotten the meaning of prepon altogether. 
 
In the late twentieth-century, the forgetting of prepon has become acutely noticeable in literary criticism 
because so many popular theories derive from deconstructive or hermeneutic philosophy. I do not mean to 
claim that the forgetting of prepon originates from these philosophies, or that these philosophies are the only 
ones which encourage critics to forget prepon, or even that deconstructive and hermeneutic methodologies 
cannot be useful tools for critics concerned with the question of propriety. I chose these two methods for 
consideration here simply because in the present scene of literary theory it is rhetorically impossible to address 
the issues involved in the question of proper reading without first distinguishing them from the issues of 
deconstruction and hermeneutics. This of course requires an examination of what is meant by propriety in these 
two philosophies. 
 
I 
The question of whether proper reading is possible in a post-structural context is often confounded since the 
word "proper" in English and other major European languages combines at least three senses which are 
distinguished clearly in Greek. Jacques Derrida calls attention to these senses in "White Mythology." The essay 
argues that a purely structural explanation of metaphor — exemplified by Aristotle's definition in the Poetics — 
will always attempt to ground the internal relations of the metaphoric structure in the integrity of the "proper" 
name. Proper names, in this sense, bear essential truth. Metaphor reveals nonessential properties; but, Derrida 
points out, although metaphor need not reveal essence, unless the essence of the substituted term is present to 
consciousness, the properties of its referent cannot be attributed to the referent of the missing term. The 
negative moment of metaphor, the moment in which A not only is B but also not B, cancels the possibility of 
the metaphor's having a "proper," that is, universal referent. As a result, "the figure of speech sets out on a 
voyage into a long and hidden sentence, a secret recitative, with no assurance that we shall be led back to the 
proper name."
3
 However, although Derrida claims that metaphor cannot display "proper" — universal, literal — 
sense, he carefully isolates what he means by the proper from the other terms Aristotle uses which usually are 
translated in French by propre (and in English by "proper"). 
 
The first term, idion, is the one Derrida focuses on; it refers to the "literal" sense of a term. As such, it is closely 
associated with the concept of "property" in the Topics. Derrida claims that in the Aristotelian scheme this kind 
of propriety underlies metaphor's ability to substitute one term for another and still make sense. But in the case 
of those metaphors missing a term (paradigmatic for Derrida) the "proper" sense is always just out of reach — 
deferred. Derrida can make this claim only because he assimilates the second term for the proper — kurion — 
with idion. Kurion refers to a noun's "current" or "ordinary" usage. Since metaphor is defined in the Poetics 
precisely as the transference of an alien (allotrios) name (in one of four ways), and since the alien is defined in 
its opposition to the current, metaphor is by definition "improper." This assimilation requires accepting the 
following argument: 
 
Though the difference between kurion and idion is never explicitly dealt with, it seems that the first 
notion, which is more frequent in the Poetics than in the Rhetoric, designates the property of a name in 
its dominant, its chief or capital sense. We must not forget that this sense of sovereignty is also the 
guiding sense of kurion. By extension, the kurion is interpreted as a primitive (as opposed to derived) 
sense, and sometimes is equivalent to the current, literal, or familiar sense. . . . ("WM," 47-48) 
 
But Paul Ricoeur strongly opposes Derrida's assimilation of the current into the literal: 
 
Must one say that ordinary usage has to be "proper," in the sense, of primitive, original, native, in order 
for there to be deviation and borrowing? It is but one step from the idea of ordinary usage to that of 
proper meaning, a step that leads to the eventually customary opposition between figurative and proper. 
Later rhetoric takes this step, but there is no evidence that Aristotle took it.
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The issue here is whether or not metaphor needs to refer to the properties of a referent in order to state 
something meaningful. Derrida's position, simply put, is that if metaphor needs to so refer, that is, if its 
statements must have "truth value" to be meaningful, then it is not meaningful. Ricoeur's position is that 
metaphor need not refer to the properties of a referent to be meaningful. 
 
Derrida's intent, as always, is to undermine structuralism from within - not to propose a theory of proper 
reading. Writing sous râture, he is marking the structuralist formulation of Aristotle's thought. Nevertheless, 
almost offhandedly Derrida observes that in Aristotle, although in one sense metaphor is by definition improper, 
in another "Nothing prevents a metaphorical lexis from being proper - that is, appropriate (prepon), suitable, 
decent, proportionate, becoming, properly related to subject and situation, to things as they are" ("WM," 47). 
Metaphor is not proper (current, ordinary - kurion) by definition, yet it must be proper (suitable, appropriate - 
prepon) in use. 
 
Ricoeur is apparently in agreement: 
 
. . . the problem of use brings up that of "appropriate" use (prepontôs khrêsthm). It is a question of 
"metaphorizing well,"  of "using in an appropriate way" the processes of lexis. (RM, 23) 
 
The difference between the two lies in what "use" means. Once kurion and idion are collapsed, use becomes 
"application," and we end up with a nominalist theory of language like that of Nelson Goodman
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 or in the 
semiotic "prison house." If kurion and idion remain distinct, however, using metaphor becomes discovery: 
 
For - and this is precisely the point - to metaphorize well cannot be taught; it is a gift of genius, of nature 
(euphuias to sêmeion estin). Are we not now back at the level of finding or inventing, of that heuristic 
that . . . violates an order to create another, that dismantles only to redescribe? (RM, 23) 
 
And thus we are apparently back to old debate, of whether the world makes sense or whether only we make 
sense of the world.
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But the issue in this debate can be described in another way. If Derrida's view is correct, the ambiguity 
surrounding the difference between the kurion and the idion allows what is in fact a purely linguistic change, 
the proportional metaphor (a change at the level of lexis), to be described as a change in the perception of phusis 
(a change at the level of dianoia), that is, as a recognition of resemblance or similarity. Derrida wants to show 
that although "metaphor (or mimesis in general) aims at the expression of knowledge" ("WM," 48) it cannot 
truly do so. Ricoeur, however, wants to resurrect metaphor's power to instruct. 
 
Resemblance, from his point of view, occurs not between the things themselves, but between the ways things 
are understood. Metaphor "suspends" reference; it does not set up a proportional ratio. Although one states the 
problem negatively and the other positively, Derrida and Ricoeur are not in conflict, at least on this issue. 
Formulated as a purely intra-linguistic change in difference, metaphor is ultimately incoherent. To understand 
metaphor as a coherent change in meaning, theory must step outside the rules of semiotics, and it must shift its 
attention from the literal to the current, from the word's relationship to things themselves to the world's 
relationships to contingency and circumstance. 
 
What can be said for metaphor can be said for reading problems in general: there is a vast difference between 
examining a statement to determine its ability to convey an understanding of metaphysical truth and examining 
a statement to determine how whatever we understand (or think we understand) is understood. The difference 
between Derrida and Ricoeur — or between Derrida and Heidegger, since Ricoeur is decidedly Heideggerian in 
this aspect of his theory of interpretation — is more than a difference of method. Although both appear to 
inquire about the nature of proper meaning, one asks about the nature of idion, the other of kurion. 
 
One of Derrida's chief claims is that an entire class of concepts — "metaphysical" concepts — are intrinsically 
improper whenever they are applied to reality. In other words, it is always improper to take a metaphysical 
concept literally. Much of Western thought, Derrida claims, has been built upon the fact that the force of the 
propriety of usage (kurion) has covered over an impropriety of application. 
 
II 
Much of Derrida's work can be understood as an exploitation of the fact that, strictly speaking, one cannot ask 
of a piece of writing if it is fit for a specific occasion (kurion), as Isocrates rightly pointed out. Writing is 
seldom meant for the occasion in which the writing takes place. It always presents us with a clear instance of 
"literal" meaning (idion). We might say that the act of writing necessarily abstracts the idion from the kurion. 
Derrida's great insight is his recognition that the linguistic reduction — the separation of langue from parole — 
has precisely the same effect on propriety that writing does; that is, it silently collapses the kurion into the idion, 
so that, although langue has no references, which are necessary for the proper performance of the kurion, after 
the reduction we tend to interpret the structural remains of discourse as if there were still references — as if 
there were still something to read. 
 
Derrida's most famous "non-concept," differance, plays upon the necessary absence of writing's references, and 
therefore upon the reader's incapacity to grasp properly (as kurion) what is read. 
 
Traditionally, the sign is first and foremost a substitute for its referent, whether considered as a present thing or 
as the sign's sense. But when the referent is not there (when what is absent cannot be made present), we go, as 
Derrida says, "through the detour of signs" (SP, 138). This detour is always at work in writing. According to the 
law of difference, as I write now I make sense only by referring to other senses, by deferring a present grasp to 
ever further elaboration. The parallel phenomena for linguistics is that sense itself has no positive value: signs 
are signs in the first place only by virtue of their differences from other signs. Saussure maintains this thesis of 
arbitrariness as the first principle of semiology. In Of Grammatology, Derrida's deconstructions undercut the 
assumed correspondence between sound and sense which, Saussure had thought, guarantees the relation 
between the sign and its referent. Speech, rather than guaranteeing a self-presence (guaranteeing that at least I 
know what I mean) is found to be always already writing, that is, always cut off from the here and now, from 
the present about which I speak. 
 
Whether or not one accepts Derrida's reversal of the dominance of speech over writing, one has difficulty 
denying that any given piece of writing (text) whose meaning cannot be "grounded" in speech (such as by 
questioning its author or by empirically "pointing" to the phenomena in question), or that any text which one 
considers a text as such (that is, as a self-enclosed entity), is governed by what Derrida has called the 
"structurality of structure."
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 The minimal claim of this concept, one that can be accepted without accepting 
Derrida's other claims, is that the moral implications of any given written text will be carried semiotically 
through a series of structural linkages which are ultimately governed by a single metaphysical opposition — 
such as good/evil, truth/falsity, freedom/oppression, etc. — and which in turn cannot be grounded in any way 
except through further linguistic linkages. The unity of the difference between the terms of such an opposition 
cannot be found in either the speech act of the speaker or in any definite, experienceable phenomena. 
Ultimately, the difference between the terms of the opposition is historically constituted by the history of 
writing itself through a process of linguistic deferral of sense and through the force of what Derrida calls the 
"traces" of former constitutions of sense.
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 Very simply put, the way one reads the difference between, say, good 
and evil in any one text is completely the product of the way one has read this difference in other texts. 
 
This last statement, however, although perhaps a good first approximation of Derrida's theory, is a trivialization 
of it. The subjectivity of the "one has read" is entirely absent from Derrida's version of differance and is more in 
line with structuralist philosophy per se, which always assumes that reading will always be the product of the 
subjectivity of the subject, that is, the imposition of the reader's own project on the passive structurality of an 
enclosed text. 
 
Derrida proposes that differance produces differences — not differance understood as the combined movement 
of differing and deferring, but differance as the underlying unity of the two. Differences, says Derrida, "have 
not fallen from the sky ready made" (SP, 141); they are historical phenomena. From now on Derrida "shall 
designate by the term differance the movement by which language, or any code, any system of reference in 
general, becomes 'historically' constituted as a fabric of differences" (SP, 141). Beneath the dual movement of 
difference and deferment, moves another, more general, containing both. 
 
This primordial movement makes signification possible by sustaining the "interval" between the signified 
present and its negatives. Any present is present only so long as it retains its relation to its past and to its future 
and yet maintains its absolute difference from them. If the interval were not sustained, past, present, and future 
would merge, undistinguished, leaving an unmitigatedly spatial "world." If the interval were sustained only by 
consciousness, its lapses and shifts would leave the world unintelligible. Since the linguistic reduction 
eliminates the possibility of the interval's being sustained by the consciousness of the individual speaker, the 
interval must be sustained by the movement of language itself, by the unity of spacing and temporalizing. 
 
Sustaining the interval, which in turn allows the present signified to be itself, is therefore not the function of the 
self, but of what Derrida calls the "trace," a concept he develops through Freud. Every act of signification 
breaks a path through the economy of differences, leaving a trace as it goes; every such act must find its way 
through patterns of past traces. These past traces act as forces, limiting and guiding the movement of the 
"present" trace, which as it moves along differentiates its trace from others not its own: "The concepts of trace 
(Spur), of facilitation (Bahnung) [literally - "path-breaking"], of forces of facilitation are . . . inseparable from 
the concept of difference" (SP, 149). We thus have an economy of force encountering an economy of 
difference, forces which produce differences by breaking them up, differences which divert and defer forces 
without finally stopping them. 
 
Since the trace, being neither of the subject nor the object, sustains the interval ("represented" in writing by the 
non-signs of spacing between words and punctuation) the trace remains silent. Like the undulation of ocean 
waves, the differentiations of sense appear on the shores of consciousness, but the origin of the forces producing 
them is lost in the distant horizon. As with the Freudian unconscious, the Derridian alterity - the ultimate 
referent of the signifier - "is definitely taken away from every process of presentation in which we would 
demand for it to be shown forth in person" (SP, 151). The "other" of present consciousness is always lost in a 
"dead time."
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In assigning to the "trace" the function of sustaining the interval, Derrida seems to imply a pathetic 
consciousness, a consciousness unable to take hold of its time, being no more than a function in a system. 
Having such a consciousness, man has never been in touch with his Being; he commands no essential force. 
Apparently, what we are to assume is that the only force possible is the arbitrary force of interpretation, a force 
justified merely by the rhetorical authority of the interpreter. 
 
But is this Derrida's view? To answer this question is difficult because in the essay "Differance," as he often 
does, he juxtaposes his differance as the "abyss between Being and beings" with the Heideggerian difference - 
with difference as the forgotten difference between Being and beings. 
 
However, the fact that Derrida juxtaposes his view of difference to Heidegger's rather than arguing against it 
implies the answer: Derrida cannot argue against Heidegger's view simply because he does not offer a contrary 
view of the same phenomena. Derrida is concerned with one kind of propriety, Heidegger with another. Derrida, 
of course, can criticize Heidegger for claiming that he destroys metaphysics through a critique of kurion. In 
effect, this is what Derrida does by offering his critique of idion. But the question of which of these two 
critiques of metaphysics is the more valid as a critique is purely a question for philosophy; it is not a question 
for literary criticism. The question here is whether the processes that each critique reveals — processes involved 
in the reader's relationship with language — are the processes central to the concern of the reader as critic. 
 
If at least for the time being we can define criticism as an activity whose purpose is to evaluate the relative 
worth of particular pieces of literature, then (again provisionally) we can say from the beginning that neither 
grammatological deconstruction nor hermeneutic interpretation can serve as the central methodology of literary 
criticism. The problem lies with their relative exclusionary principles, that is, their definitions of propriety. 
Deconstruction can exclude texts which improperly center their structures on "metaphysical" oppositions, or, 
since this would pretty much exclude everything, it can refuse to exclude anything, and heap its praise and focus 
its attention upon texts which call attention to their own ungroundedness, to the fact that they are writing. 
 
Heideggerian hermeneutics, on the other hand, with its focus on our everyday understanding and the propriety 
of circumstance (kurion), must include anything which is thoroughly situated in its time and place, and it will 
praise that which exemplifies situatedness or being bound by limitations. It is the very opposite of criticism in 
that it defines understanding in terms of engagement and presence, rather than critical distance. 
 
III 
Heidegger is able to analyze signification in its relationship to the kurion because, rather than performing the 
linguistic reduction,
10
 he performs the phenomenological reduction which disengages consciousness from the 
natural attitude, which posits existence — for the sign, proper ("literal," idion) meaning. At the same time, 
however, this move leaves the sign's relationships to entities other than and including other signs intact, albeit in 
a general, non-specific manner, thus putting Heidegger's analysis at the "ontological" level as opposed to the 
"ontic," the level of the historically specific, particular situation (the level of the prepon). 
 
Thus, unlike Derrida's differance, which attempts to follow the trace of the difference which establishes the 
identity of the sign, Heidegger's seeks the trace of the "ontological difference," the forgotten difference between 
Being and beings. For a theory of reading, the ontological difference is analogous to the difference between 
meaning (Bedeutung) and sense (Sinn).
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 Sense is to meaning as beings are to Being. Whereas for Derrida the 
trace of differance is effaced and its source forever lost, thus rendering the sign incapable of grounding, in and 
of itself, its proper (idion) meaning, for Heidegger, though the trace of the ontological difference is effaced the 
moment sense is made present, that trace "remains preserved" (H, 336; SP, 157) so that its path and its origins 
are recoverable. 
 
Put into terms of reading theory, when we attend to signs a sense, or structure, of the text comes to light and a 
meaning, or content, comes to light, but we then necessarily forget the relation between them — the 
differentiation of one from the other. Since the trace of this difference is not apparent, it is natural to think that 
the structurality of the text — the sense it makes — is its meaning, just as metaphysics tends to think that the 
totality of being is Being, when in actuality the movement of difference is what is truly at stake. 
 
This difference can be recovered, according to Heidegger, only by letting the sign be seen as it is in use, which 
means, among other things, that the analysis of the ontological difference must take place without benefit of the 
linguistic reduction.
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 The reduction disengages the sign from its relationships to all entities other than signs, 
and since it is precisely these relationships which are at stake at the level of the kurion, signs must be allowed to 
be involved with them. 
 
In Being and Time Heidegger says, "Letting an entity be involved, if we understand this ontologically, consists 
in previously freeing it for its readiness-to-hand within the environment."
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 According to Heidegger, letting be 
is the non-formal a priori "condition for the possibility for encountering anything ready-to-hand" (BT, 117) so 
that whatever is usable for making must be discovered to be already for this use. And this includes making 
sense through signs: ". . . signs, in the first instance, are themselves items of equipment whose specific character 
as equipment consists in showing or indicating" (BT, 108). 
 
Here Heidegger is careful to distinguish among indicating, referring, and relating: 
 
Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every "indication" is a reference, but 
not every referring is an indicating. This implies at the same time that every "indication" is a relation, 
but not every relation is an indicating. (BT, 108) 
 
A relation (Beziehung) "is something quite formal which may be read off directly by way of 'formalization' 
from any kind of context, whatever its subject matter or its way of Being" (BT, 108). Relations, in other words, 
are structural in the sense that Derrida uses that term. A reference (Verweisung)
14
, however, is encountered only 
in our dealings with equipment," which in turn ". . . is essentially 'something in-order-to' . . " (BT, 97). 
 
Now the sign is a kind of equipment. As such, like all equipment, it is constituted by reference (among other 
references). Unlike other equipment, its specific "in order-to" is to indicate, to point toward (BT, 109). The sign, 
therefore, is not essential to the Being of the ready-to-hand as such. The ready-to-hand is already there, waiting 
for its sign. 
 
We must note, then, that a reference finds its place in the referential totality to which it belongs under the 
direction of the "toward-which" of the whole. Likewise, the sign — even if it finds its "place" in its difference 
from other signs — still belongs to the same totality as that of the reference it merely indicates or marks. A sign 
cannot be "a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating"; rather, it is "an item of 
equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment to our circumspection . . ." (BT, 110). Accordingly, a 
sign cannot be "authentically encountered" from a theoretical standpoint; it can be so encountered only in use. 
 
Thus when Heidegger asks, "What is the appropriate way of having to do with signs?" his answer is to "give 
way" to them, to take a direction from them, to let them be themselves in their reference of indicating. So long 
as I look at the sign only in its relations to other signs, I prevent it from doing its work as equipment arid 
completely miss its references. For not only is the reference not a thing, it is not a sign; rather, it is "the 
foundation upon which signs are based" (BT, 114). But, if the difference between the reference and the 
indication is not formal but thoroughly practical, then I can authentically grasp the sign only when we are 
already concerned with the equipmentality it refers to. 
 
Moreover, I must understand in advance (though not necessarily thematically that letting the sign do its work as 
equipment — letting it be involved in a context of references — is but one special kind of relation within a 
totality of references: 
 
Whenever we let there be an involvement with something in something beforehand, our doing so is 
grounded in our understanding such things as letting something be involved, and such things as the 
"with-which" of involvement. Anything of this sort, and anything else that is basic for it, such as the 
"toward-this" as that in which there is an involvement, or such as the "for-the-sake-of-which" to which 
every "toward-which" ultimately goes back — all these must be disclosed beforehand with a certain 
intelligibility. (BT, 118-19) 
 
The relational character of reference is accordingly quite different from that of indication. Heidegger calls this 
character "meaning" (bedeuten).
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 In order to grasp the sign authentically, I must first be inclined to let the sign 
be "involved" — I must myself become a part of the general movement of involvement. 
 
Involvement, the "character of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand . . ." (BT, 115), is always "definable as 
a context of assignments or references . . ." (BT, 121). For equipment to be equipment, something must be 
involved with other things in a complex of others toward something, in order to do something, for the sake of 
something. The movement of meaning is not simply one of difference and deferment, but one of what I shall 
call deference. To let something be involved, a sign especially, I "submit" (anweisen) or "refer myself" to this 
movement: I defer. I take a part in an "` a priori' letting-something-be-involved" - deference - which is "the 
condition for the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand . . ." (BT, 11-7). Because of this ontological 
deference, when I deal with an entity ontically, I can "let it be involved (defer) in the ontical sense" (BT, 117). 
 
Understood ontologically, then, signs are the province of the kurion, not the idion. They never indicate the 
"properties" (Eigenschaften) of a "thing" so long as property signifies "some definite character which it is 
possible for things to possess" (BT, 114-15). Understood in terms of deference, "Anything ready-to-hand is, at 
worst, appropriate for some purposes and inappropriate for others; and its 'properties' are, as it were, still bound 
up in these ways in which it is appropriate or inappropriate" (BT, 115). What we grasp through a sign is the 
appropriateness (Geeigentheit) of an entity's references, not a thing-in-itself, not a "concept," not a "surface 
structure." That appropriateness (kurion) is its meaning; in turn, the meaning of a sign lies in its appropriate 
indication of a meaning. Truly enough, meaning "can be taken formally in the sense of a system of Relations" 
(BT, 121) - through an ascesis I can always volatize meaning into structure. Yet as Heidegger warns, "in such 
formalizations the phenomena get leveled off so much that their real phenomenal content may be lost, 
especially in the case of such 'simple' relationships as those which lurk in meaning" (BT, 121). One such simple 
relationship is the "A is B" of metaphor which, according to Derrida, stands at the center of every linguistic 
structure. In order to avoid covering over the phenomenal content indicated by such structures as the metaphor I 
must let signs refer to their equipmentality; that is, I must let them do their work of indicating or pointing 
toward the "references" of entities, their meanings. 
 
Unlike Derridian differance, in Heideggerian deference, 
 
. . . the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a "towards-which" is not an entity with the 
kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is 
defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary 
"towards-which" is not just another "towards-this" as something in which an involvement is possible. 
The primary "towards-which" is a "for-the-sake-of-which." But the "for-the-sake-of" always pertains to 
the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue. (BT, 116-17) 
 
Understanding meaning is therefore understanding what is significant for Dasein. Ultimately, for Heidegger, 
proper reading is deference to Dasein. 
 
Now, we misunderstand entirely Heidegger's analysis if we take Dasein to be only ourselves - me and you, this 
person or that one. These signs, any signs, are not for us but, as Heidegger puts it, for "them": 
 
. . . the "they" itself prescribes that way of interpreting the world and Being-in-the-world which lies 
closest. Dasein is for the sake of the "they" in an everyday manner, and the "they" itself Articulates the 
referential context of meaning. (BT, 116-17) 
 
The "they" (das Man) is one of the most difficult of Heidegger's notions. Tracing the idion never ends but 
becomes a lost foray into an infinite textuality; tracing the kurion ends in das Man. According to Heidegger, 
everything I ordinarily do has already been done by "them" although in a general manner. The "they" is real - 
"the 'Realest subject" of everydayness" (BT, 166). I can be "concerned about" things ready-to-hand only if I 
have been first "concerned for" Dasein - for "them," and what "they" do (BT, 157). All this means is that Being-
in-the-world is a Being-with-others before it is a Being-with-things. Dasein's understanding of Being always 
"already implies the understanding of Others" (BT, 161). 
 
Heidegger's "they" clearly is the key to his theory of interpretation. "An interpretation," says Heidegger, "is 
never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us" (BT, 191-92). Interpretation always 
presupposes some understanding. In interpretation, properly speaking, "the understanding appropriates 
understandingly that which is understood by it" (BT, 188). To appropriate (aneigen), to make one's own, is to 
understand in one's own way what he has already understood in a concrete yet general way through the "they": 
 
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'meaning' over some naked thing which is present-at-
hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the 
thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and 
this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation. (BT, 190-91) 
 
Thus that which we can articulate has already been articulated for us in a general way by the "they" (BT, 203). 
Accordingly, when we discourse about the world - put its significance into language by making sense of it - that 
sense, our linguistic articulation, is always bound up with the sense that has been made of it. 
 
More simply put, the totality of meanings (the references our talk is always primordially about) is always 
already broken up into sense by the everyday talk that goes with our everyday dealings with the ready-to-hand: 
"Meaning [Bedeutungen], as what has been Articulated from that which can be articulated, always carry sense 
[Sinn' (BT, 204). Through discourse, through our everyday use of language "words accrue" (BT, 204) to 
meanings. Heidegger's existential understanding of language stands firmly opposed to the structural view in 
which possible linguistic structures get applied to things and events in the world: ". . . word-Things do not get 
supplied with meanings" (BT, 204). 
 
Thus for Heidegger, understanding what discourse is about must precede any structural formulations of the 
discourse's language. But we must always bear in mind that the "what" is primordially the entities' references of 
involvement - their deferential relations - and only secondarily the entities themselves as present-to-hand. 
 
Heidegger believes that through a deferral to the "they"' we have always in principle, if not in practice, the 
possibility of interpreting every instance of discourse in our own language. That possibility, of course, is seldom 
more than a very general, indefinite one, for it remains to the individual act of application to make each reading 
specifically significant for the present situation of the reader. 
 
Nevertheless, because the affordances (Möglichkeit - possibility) of the sign in its Being as ready-to-hand "exert 
their counter-thrust (Rückschlag) upon Dasein" (BT, 188), our projection (Entwurf) of sense upon a text need 
not be, and should not be, with regard to a scheme thought out in advance. It need not be ascetic: 
 
Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself toward a plan that has been thought out, and in 
accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. (BT, 185) 
 
Although it is always possible, as Heidegger says, for an interpretation to "force the entity into concepts to 
which it is opposed in its manner of Being" (BT, 191), such reading ignores or forgets the counter-force of the 
public way; it refuses to defer, to appropriate the text within the limits of everyday understanding. 
 
IV 
The distinction between the Derridian trace and the Heideggerian trace seems sharp and definite: it seems an 
irreconcilable difference, as indeed it is. From Derrida's standpoint - from the view afforded by a relentless 
pursuit of a transcendental, or even a ultra-transcendental signified - the trace of deference Heidegger describes 
can be seen only as an absence of sense, an absence merely substituted for in deferment after deferment, a 
pursuit blindly unaware that the sign's signified is never primordially an object over and against the subjectivity 
of a subject. For Heidegger, the trace sustaining the interval (the difference constituting the sign itself) is of the 
public way from which all individual expressions arise and to which they are always leveled, a way always 
effaced and never made explicit (for "they" are no one) but nevertheless the presence underlying every present, 
a way that we first and for the most part follow. 
 
However, although this difference is irreconcilable it is not for ail that a conflicting difference, a difference 
which cannot persist unless one is "wrong" and the other "right." Those of us who are concerned with reading 
theory must recognize that Derrida's différance and Heidegger's das Man in effect answer different questions of 
the same phenomena. Derrida asks how differences function in language; Heidegger asks why. These are 
philosophical questions which should not receive the same answer, and neither is the primary question for 
literary criticism. 
 
Both Derrida's and Heidegger's answers are correct from the perspective of their own questions, yet both are 
completely inadequate to provide a basis for a theory of proper reading. Derrida is hypercritical. His 
deconstructive schemes, motivated by a quest for Truth, by a belief that a name should properly attach to an 
object over and against the subject, are predicated by an ultimate distancing, the result of reducing from 
language not only reference but also motive. Such a reduction exposes the sign as a mere negative, a difference 
from other signs which, now that it is no longer held in place by a motive, is exposed as a mere function which 
as a function can only defer to other signs. 
 
Heidegger's reduction retains, in fact accentuates, motives revealing the interpretive processes of the engaged, 
"involved," or in other words naive reader, thus making possible the development of a reflexive hermeneutics, 
such as Gadamer's. Yet, this very reflexiveness prevents any measuring of the distance between the text and the 
self: it is decidedly non-critical, allowing an understanding of the self's engagement with the text, but not its 
difference from it. 
 
Thus the questions Derrida and Heidegger ask of difference, general and philosophic as they are, and in general 
answers — which we can call textuality and publicness, respectively — and do little in themselves toward 
answering the literary critic's overriding question about the specific differences between texts and statements 
within texts. The preceding analysis of Derrida's and Heidegger's understanding of difference, I now must 
claim, exemplifies a kind of differential analysis which is specific to literary (in the broad sense) criticism even 
as it generates the terms within which all such analysis must take place. Criticism, what I have called "proper 
reading," cannot allow differences to become the scene of dialectic or deconstruction or interpretation or any 
reading process which perpetuates conflict and contradiction or promotes reconciliation or subsumption. The 
very purpose of criticism is to be critical — it puts texts in their place. It cooperates with texts in their struggle 
to make a difference, but that difference being made, it enforces the distinctions those differences represent. In 
other words, criticism must assume the sophistic stance that whatever can be said is necessarily both true and 
false — it is just a matter of finding the question to which the statement might be an answer. The following 
represents the search for the question to which the preceding analysis is the answer: 
 
If Derrida's theory of structurality is correct, at the center of every structure is an opposition, hierarchically 
ordered so that one suppresses, dominates, or excludes the other. The statement "At the center of text X lies 
opposition A/B in which A suppresses B" elicits the following questions: 
 
1. Is this the case? The elucidation of an answer to this question must be some sort of structural analysis, 
structural in the broad sense as Derrida commonly uses the term. Such an analysis need not be aware that it is 
answering the question in the above form; at its simplest, it need only claim that the text presents a unity of part 
and whole. It is critical to the extent that it consciously establishes a text from a particular point of view. 
 
2. How is this the case? This question requires a critique, a "deconstructive" response, because it 
presupposes the structurality of the response to question one. That is, it presupposes that the textuality of text X 
has been established by the answer to question 1.
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 It is hypercritical to the extent that it traces the effects of 
having established a point of view. 
 
3. Why is this the case? This is the hermeneutic question, and it requires an interpretation for an answer. 
Primarily, interpretation determines motive, or "meaning" in Heidegger's terminology. Interpretation may be 
structural, naive, or reflexive. A structural interpretation imports an heuristic order, such as Freudian theory or 
systematic theology, to elucidate the motivations for a text's arrangement of part to whole. Naive interpretation, 
characterized by what Heidegger calls "involvement," is unsystematic, unaware of its points of view and its 
presuppositions and prejudices, to use Gadamer's term. Reflexive interpretation seeks to become aware of its 
prejudices, presuppositions, and points of view. 
 
4. Whether this should be the case? This is the question of propriety (prepon), the ultimate, evaluative 
question for criticism. To be such a simple question — "Whether or not A should suppress B" — it seems 
extraordinarily difficult to answer, for it apparently requires answers to the first three questions to answer its 
own. However, what prepon means, and whether its question stakes out a special territory for literary criticism, 
depends entirely upon how one answers this delicate question. 
 
5.  
There are only three responses to the question of whether or not A should dominate B in the central opposition 
of text X: 
 
— Yes, A should dominate B. 
 
— No, B should dominate A. 
 
These first two responses presuppose the stability of the text and require reference to some outside order, 
theological or ideological, which in a presumed hierarchical arrangement of texts or orders is ranked higher than 
the text in question. Most of what historians of criticism have called "moral criticism" respond in this way. The 
positive "should" of these first two responses, however, carries the implicit claim that A and B have "proper" 
references, proper in the sense of the Greek term idion, which therefore have distinguishable properties 
maintaining their differences without regard to the linguistic order in which the statement "A should dominate 
B" has been written. These first two responses accordingly will always be open to the critique of deconstruction. 
 
— No, A should not dominate B; B should not dominate A. 
 
This, as a universal response to our question, takes into account the character of linguistic difference, the ever-
present possibility of deconstruction, and the grarnmatological conclusion that metaphysical oppositions cannot 
be grounded and that the determination of the text, as such, is always an act of will, conscious or unconscious. 
Since our language works in such a way that the choice of A over B must be arbitrary in the sense that it cannot 
be fixed in the properties of a referent, this response assumes that the meanings of A and B persist only in terms 
of our understanding of the relationship between them. When our question is answered this way, the "referent" 
persists only as a balance, perhaps as a tension, between A and B: there is no hierarchical ordering of the two. 
 
Concern for prepon, therefore, is a concern for balance, and prepon itself, as the ideal balance between the 
opposing metaphysical terms that lie at the center of a structure, serves as a universal standard of measure 
against which one may weigh the actual structurality of any text. 
 
Such a standard is possible only for non-reductive reading. Whereas deconstruction and hermeneutic retrieval 
require a linguistic reduction (to langue) and a phenomenological reduction (from postulation of existence), 
respectively, proper (prepon) reading cannot survive such reductions, since the balance in question is precisely 
one of the text's truth claims within particular circumstances. However, this does not mean that "proper" reading 
is necessarily naive reading, for the issue is not whether truth claims are legitimate or the circumstances are 
verifiable, but whether the claims are balanced within the circumstances as they are understood. Proper reading, 
in other words, attempts to define the circumstances under which the text's structure would be balanced. 
 
Proper reading can achieve this goal because it is both engaged and critical. An adherence to the standard of 
balanced opposites will curtail the projection of the reader's prejudices onto the text, even though the standard 
cannot pre-empt faulty presuppositions, because the possibility of "taking sides" is ruled out in advance. 
Prejudice, of course, is necessary to the reader's pre-understanding, and a non-reductive reading according to the 
universal standard provides the engagement necessary for understanding. Yet, it provides the distance necessary 
to avoid merely idiosyncratic misreadings without having to rely on either a previously conceived heuristic 
order or on some kind of reduction from the full force of discourse. 
 
In the latter methods, critical distance is achieved by the substitution or comparison of one order by or to 
another. Thus these methods are necessarily anachronistic because they must either re-write the text in terms not 
endemic to its context or they must remove it from context altogether. But proper reading is not anachronistic 
and can answer its question from within the text's own context simply because an understanding of the context 
is not necessary to be able to answer the question of whether or not the central opposition should be balanced or 
hierarchical: the answer is always that the opposition should be balanced. 
 
But if the answer to this primary question is always the same, what good does it do to ask it? The response is 
simple: when this question is primary, it profoundly affects the nature of the other questions — the structural, 
deconstructive, and hermeneutic questions — by limiting their scope. 
 
1. The structural question now becomes "Is it the case that A and B do not dominate or repress one 
another?" The answer here will always ultimately be "no." The reason is that the standard of propriety is 
unrealizable, and although of course some texts will approach balance more nearly than others, given the fact of 
changing circumstances, perfect balance is unattainable. Altering the structural question in effect collapses the 
structural and deconstructive questions into one question ' "How do A and B deviate from their ideal balance?" 
Since the question of propriety presupposes the necessity of a balanced opposition at the center of an integrated 
structure, merely posing the question has the same "de-centering" effects as an act of deconstruction. Any act of 
structuring according to the norm of balance will be able to identify the "gaps" and "fissures" of the text. 
Moreover, deconstructive activity will no longer need to pursue aimlessly its signifiers into infinity or to be 
content with merely reversing the hierarchical order, for it will have as its aim the pursuit of the structural 
modifications that would have achieved a balance. 
2. The hermeneutic question now becomes, "Why is it the case that A and B are not in balance?" Just as the 
structural/deconstructive question, now subordinated to the question of propriety, shifts its focus from the 
search for textuality in general to the deviations of a particular text from a balanced order, the hermeneutic 
question must now focus on the "referentiality" of a particular text in a particular historical situation (more 
specifically, on the motivations behind the text's deviations from balance) and on understanding texts as 
responses to other texts. Harold Bloom's studies of "revision" are an approximate example of one level of this 
latter approach, but Bloom's studies depend upon "original" texts for their standpoint (originality itself being an 
interpretive product) rather than the ideal standard of balanced opposites. 
 
Certainly there is a considerable amount of work to be done in order to work out the implications of this 
subordination of the structural/deconstructive and hermeneutic questions to the question of propriety. However, 
the chief effect is quite clear: these primarily philosophical questions have now become questions appropriate to 
the pursuit of literary criticism, questions which will allow critics to distinguish texts according to a norm, a 
fixed standard. 
 
V 
Now arises the issue of the worth of having such a norm. Some of the benefits have already been touched upon: 
 
1. The norm provides a fixed standpoint which curtails the effects of ideological prejudice on evaluation while 
allowing them the free play necessary for understanding. In other words, adherence to the norm provides the 
reader with a point of view which is ideologically "neutral" since it is purely negative and can have no project 
of its own (A can act to suppress B and B can act to suppress A but propriety can demand only that neither 
suppress the other). Thus the normative standpoint is both engaged and critical. 
 
2. The subordination of the structural/deconstructive question and the hermeneutic question to the question of 
propriety creates a perspective from which the former questions can be seen to be equally valuable and in fact 
interrelated rather than mutually exclusive opposites. The ideal goal of balanced opposites provides a fixed 
point from which to shift from one question and its respective level of activity to the other, and it prevents the 
aimless regress which these methods tend toward since they have no critical goal of their own. 
 
A third, more important benefit follows from this last observation, namely that a reader, a concrete self, is 
consciously pursuing an articulated goal — a more comfortable status, for me at least, than being a mere 
function of a system blindly pursuing signs or a "there-being" submitting to an anonymous "'them." We can say 
that a self pursues this goal because he or she pursues it by exercising the power of the negative. The 
importance of criticism's having access to the negative has been elaborated in the American critical tradition 
first by Irving Babbitt
17 
and later by Kenneth Burke.
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 The central point for both of these men is that the 
capacity to assert the negative is exclusively human, non-natural, and that it is the only possibility for attaining 
self criticism — the ability to criticize one's own actions or for one's method to evaluate itself. The only reason 
that the methods we have been discussing can be performed at all is that their negative moments are exercised 
up front in the form of their respective reductions. The decision to perform these reductions is indeed an act of 
thinking, but all that can follow such global negatives are merely descriptions of and responses to the 
phenomena these reductions open up. Structuralism, deconstruction, and hermeneutics cannot ask the "whether" 
question, so how can they answer "No"? These methods deny the reader's personal agency as they deny 
distinctions of value among texts. In effect, they deny the existence of the self because they methodologically 
exclude its possibility in advance. 
 
Proper reading, of course, is not the only way to preserve the reader's self. "Moral" criticisms, those which ask 
the question "whether" from the vantage point of a theology or ideology, preserve the self but do so at the 
expense of the integrity of the text. Marxists, Christians, and so forth convert the "No" into a "Thou shalt not," 
by shifting the locus of measure from the text's own central opposition to that of an authoritative ideology. One 
could argue that this move also effectively suppresses the self, but even given the possibility of an authentic 
conversion, the move unquestionably subordinates the text to an alien set of ideas. Proper reading is the only 
way of reading that can evaluate without morally condemning or praising and still allow the text its place within 
the world. 
 
A fourth and most important benefit of proper reading is that it allows texts to be judged in terms of the 
circumstances of their production and reception. Although its emphasis on balance and centrality make proper 
reading seem to be yet another neo-Kantian criticism, and though indeed the judgment of propriety is a kind of 
aesthetic judgment, it is not one which presupposes an abstraction from practicality. Rather than judging the 
poem's or novel's structural balance after it has been disengaged from the world of practical affairs and from its 
relationship to textual predecessors, proper reading judges the poem's balancing response to the excesses of its 
predecessors and its productive circumstances as it defines them. Like Marxism, proper reading redefines 
criticism as a form of historical labor, though of course unlike Marxism, it has no predefined program it hopes 
will relace a rotten past. 
 
VI 
This is not to say that proper reading does not imply an ideology, because it does, as all methodologies do. But 
it is an appropriating ideology rather than a dominating or supplanting one. Marxism seeks to supplant 
capitalism, deconstruction to supplant structuralism, romanticism to supplant classicism, and so on. Proper 
reading seeks merely the appropriate place of all such isms. Words must have a place, and the ideas which are 
the products of words must have a place, and to be in place means to not usurp the place of others. For example, 
Derrida's and Heidegger's accounts of propriety differ, and it is because they differ that they can be read. But 
more important, because they differ one cannot replace the other. The task of proper reading is to work out how 
they differ, why they differ, and grasping this will always justify proper reading's starting point - the assumption 
that one should not replace, supplant, or dominate the other. 
 
Thus proper reading seeks to delimit the legitimate boundaries of individual instances of discourse, boundaries 
that the discourses very likely do not recognize themselves. The nature of such boundaries may be infinitely 
various, and the procedures for discovering them may be equally various, but to the critic any such procedures 
will always submit to a central principle, namely, that prepon supercedes all other questions of propriety. For 
prepon to take its rightful place, a willing, concrete human self must exercise his or her capacity to assert the 
negative and resist the easier path of blindly following the dictates of the theologies, ideologies, and 
methodologies which may so easily replace human judgment. 
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